Yet in a geopolitical sense, I think that Yanukovych has miscalculated. With breathtaking naivety, he assumed that if Ukraine gave Russia everything it reasonably could ask for, the pressure would stop. Instead, Russian pressure has intensified. We see this with the Naftogaz-Gazprom merger proposal. We see it with demands to acquire more and more assets in Ukraine’s energy system and the pressure on the gas transit system. It is already reaching a point where the businesses that support the Party of Regions, those upon whom Yanukovych depends, are feeling pinched.


But Yanukovych has already thrown his strongest cards away. First, he has conceded everything regarding the Black Sea Fleet. Second, he secured none of the quid pro quos he sought over energy (including the abandonment of the South Stream pipeline and a guarantee of minimal Russian gas trans-shipments across Ukraine’s pipelines to Europe).


Third, he has widened the field of internal opposition, alienating not only Tymoshenko’s most devoted supporters, but those, like [former chief of staff in Yushchenko's administration Viktor] Baloha, who threw all of their efforts behind the formation of a centrist coalition with him, which he, unceremoniously has spurned.


And fourth, having assured Brussels that his top priority was to enter the European Union, he did not even have the courtesy to consult with the EU before concluding these extraordinary agreements. So when he gets into trouble with Russia, who will he mobilize? Who will rally behind him? Maybe no one, because he has rejected them, and they have walked away.


The approach to the accords has been improvised, everything has been done with breathtaking incompetence, belligerence and haste. That includes the all too sudden geopolitical shift: the astonishing brusque termination of intelligence collaboration with NATO, the de facto (if still unacknowledged) halting of defense and security sector reform, the return of the old guard to the Ministry of Defense, general staff and SBU [Security Service of Ukraine], the carte blanche given to Russian intelligence services, and most astonishingly, the preservation of all the deficiencies of the 1997 Black Sea Fleet accords, now extended to 2042. That’s an astonishingly cynical price to pay for what is likely to be a short-term boost in economic performance and internal popularity.”


KP: The West, namely Brussels and Washington, D.C., seems to be turning a blind eye to a lot of events in Ukraine. Why is this so? Have they turned their backs on Ukraine, or do they see recent events in Ukraine as positive developments?


JS: “The naivety of Yanukovych and his partners is to forget that for Russia, Ukraine’s independence is an historical aberration. As long as Russia feels it holds the cards – and that is exactly the way it feels now – it will not let up the pressure until it feels it has succeeded in reducing Ukraine’s independence to a purely decorative state. Moscow seeks complete control of Ukraine’s energy sector and a veto over who, if anyone, can develop new energy resources. It seeks the integration of Ukraine’s defense and intelligence structures into Russia’s own. It also seeks unrestricted and unfettered operation of Russian capital inside Ukraine. Once you have all of those, what independence is left?


First, let’s understand that the absence of Western reaction thus far reflects a large degree of shock. Experts might have understood what the March 9 coalition law and the new coalition meant. But bureaucracies and the decision-makers of the EU, NATO and the U.S. absorb information much more slowly, and they are only beginning to adjust to the fact that events are taking a different course from what was expected. So, the pertinent question is what the Western reaction will be in six months time after a proper assessment is made. Even now, the EU is not blind to the fact that, when it came to gas, Yanukovych presented them with a fait accompli. Yet, for some bizarre set of reasons, the new authorities expect that the EU will still hand over funds for modernising Ukraine’s gas transit system.


Of course, the post-Cold War generation of leaders in the West has disappeared. The new generation have both a broader and much narrower range of concerns. Ukraine, East-Central Europe, the Black Sea and Caspian Sea are no longer the center of attention that they were before the events of 9/11. Certainly not in the United States! And one must then ask whether the EU as a whole has a vision of itself beyond recovery from the financial crisis and coping with the Greek emergency.


So, much as I lament it and condemn it, Ukraine has been off the radar. And the Russians know this better than anyone else.


They have concluded, cynically but entirely rationally, that they should use this moment to grab everything they can get. That’s not because they are confident in themselves. Quite the opposite. They know that despite modest recovery from the financial crisis, their underlying problems are serious. They have no clue how to address their modernization agenda, to measure up to the performance, adaptability and innovation of the BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India, China], and that the various insurgencies in the North Caucasus are tantamount to having a bit of Afghanistan in one’s backyard. Ironic, is it not, how the moments of convenience coincide: How Yanukovych, for internal reasons, and the Moscow tandem, for geopolitical reasons, seek to grab as much power as they can before the window of opportunity closes.”


KP: Are there any instruments that the West and the opposition in Ukraine can utilize to change this tilt of Ukraine towards Russia?

JS: “Let’s be harshly realistic. In the short term, few or none. The West needs to have a clear mind and be clear about what it communicates to Ukraine’s new authorities. Ukraine is a sovereign country. It has the right to diminish cooperation with us or even end it, with or without consultation. We should not pound the table, threaten, preach, whine or complain.


But Ukraine needs to understand that we have our interests too, not to say principles. Just as Ukraine is a sovereign state, the EU is a union of sovereign states.


Just as Ukraine’s authorities must address their economic priorities and answer to their people, the EU must answer to the European taxpayer, who has every right to demand to know who is receiving their money and why. The EU has no obligation to finance economic inefficiency and malpractice, let alone an energy sector that has turned its back on the standards and principles of the Energy Community.


And we certainly have no obligation to subsidize Russia and its energy policy. NATO has been present in Ukraine because three presidents concluded that this served Ukraine’s national interests. They also concluded that NATO played an irreplaceable role in securing defence reform in the country. If the new authorities take a different view, that is their prerogative, and if they want us to leave or diminish our presence, we should. But if they put us under pressure and make us feel unwelcome, we should take the initiative and depart before we are asked to. Ukraine has to choose, and we have to respect its choice. Ukraine will then have to accept the consequences of its choices and live with them.


“Over the mid-term, I think the new authorities will regret living with the choices they are making today. By that point, I hope the West will take Ukraine more seriously than it does today and be capable of conducting a more serious discussion than it does today. I also hope, by then, we will finally be in a position to present Ukraine with a real perspective of integration and with our conditions for realizing it.”


KP: Speaking of the opposition, if it comes to power should they denounce the Russian Black Sea Fleet agreement?

JS: “Well, there is a problem, isn’t there? The opposition will be on firm legal grounds denouncing that agreement. That is not the issue, at least where Ukraine is concerned. But to Moscow, it will be a big issue, and in practice a casus belli. Quite an expensive casus belli, because in five years time, Russia’s economic investment in Crimea will be far greater than it is today. One shudders to think of what can happen. Would it not therefore make sense for the opposition, perhaps with advice from outside experts, to think of how these new, most regrettable and grotesquely unfavourable agreements could be amended with provisions and safeguards to ensure that the Black Sea Fleet conforms to normal international deployment practice in a foreign country; that its intelligence presence be curbed and controlled; that its economic interests be transparent, regulated and properly taxed, that its employment in any activity short of national self-defense be subject to oversight and approval? These modifications would not only be in Ukraine’s interests, but Europe’s interests, and if the EU and NATO wish to avoid tension, not to say conflict, they should encourage such a process — and participate in it — as soon as possible.”


KP: Are you talking about a possibility of a civil conflict in Ukraine?

JS: “Not so much because of the Black Sea Fleet, but because Yanukovych is governing a divided country in a divisive way. Ukrainians are not used to this. Imagine the following scenario one year from now, when tempers are running higher than they are today. A group of musicians enter a bar in Lviv and start singing «LIUBE» [a Russian band singing military songs] repertoire in Russian. They are asked to stop and they don’t. It sparks a fight which spreads. Supposing the local militia support the local residents? What does the Interior Ministry under its new authority do? I don’t like the question, but it is necessary to pose it. I don’t like posing a second question: for how long will we be able to say that Ukrainians are all moderate people and, irrespective of how they are governed, will publicly roll over and privatize their worries and reactions?”


KP: What do you think is the end-game in all of this? Do you think they are driven by national interests or gains in their personal pockets?


JS: We should not forget the historical context. In the Soviet Union, security meant, first and foremost, security of the regime. Yanukovych is part of this tradition. For him, geopolitics is the extension, and the servant, of the process of regime creation and perpetuation. That is what I think he is after. Of course, Russia is in so many ways different. It is an enormously significant geopolitical player. Why does Russia’s military doctrine define NATO as the ‘main danger’ to Russian security, when any passenger on the Moscow metro knows that the main danger is something very different? Because the NATO enemy helps to sustain a particular regime and model of development. Why is Moscow so keen to show that Ukraine’s independence is an historical aberration and that the project of its integration with the West is over? In order to reaffirm the legitimacy of the regime and its definition of Russian identity. What has happened thanks to Yanukovych has given the Moscow tandem a new lease on life, whatever the configuration of power that emerges in 2012. I fear that the latest events in Ukraine will be very bad for those in Russia who know or sense that the neo-imperial paradigm is an obstacle to the transformation of Russia into a modern and decent country.”


KP: Do you see Ukraine crossing a point of no return in its rapprochement with Moscow?

JS: “In the literal sense, Ukraine has already reached a point of no-return. It no longer is possible simply to undo what has been done. The February elections and the Kharkiv accords have changed so much that the country will never simply be able to go back through the same door whence it came.

The flaws will become visible and the contradictions will build up. By then, a new path and a new door will appear, and there will be new leaders too. But they are not visible today.


We can, and also must, engage the new authorities in any dialogue open to us, with the aim of focusing their attention on the implications and consequences of their actions. Let’s not exclude the possibility that they will evolve and, in their own interests, seek to abandon the basis of consultation, participation and even power.


If the opposition is to play this role, it will have to renew itself. Until it comes to terms with what went wrong between 2005 and 2010, it won’t be able to renew itself.


I am confident of one thing. The more Ukrainians know of Russia, the more they will conclude that it is not a healthy model for Ukraine. It is no longer the country in which, like Ukraine, money bought power and de facto privatized part of the state.


Under Putin, it has become a different place: a place where power buys money, where anyone powerful enough can seize property and assets belonging to others. If you want something and you are big enough, take it!


That model has driven millions of Russians out of the country, a disproportionate percentage of whom amount to the ‘best and the brightest.’ Is that an appropriate model for Ukraine? I doubt it. I think that Yanukovych also doubts it. So instead of thinking about ‘points of no return,’ we need to think about what the West should propose to Ukraine once its authorities find themselves in a dead end. They will. The question then is whether Yanukovych’s opposition and Ukraine’s friends abroad have something to say.”